ABSTRACT. Two person zero sum differential games of survival are considered; these terminate as soon as the trajectory enters a given closed set F, at which time a cost or payoff is computed. One controller, or player, chooses his control values to make the payoff as large as possible, the other player chooses his controls to make the payoff as small as possible. A strategy is a function telling a player how to choose his control variable and values of the game are introduced in connection with there being a delay before a player adopts a strategy. It is shown that various values of the differential game satisfy dynamic programming identities or inequalities and these results enable one to show that if the value functions are continuous on the boundary of F then they are continuous everywhere. To discuss continuity of the values on the boundary of F certain comparison theorems for the values of the game are established. In particular if there are sub-and super-solutions of a related Isaacs-Bellman equation then these provide upper and lower bounds for the appropriate value function. Thus in discussing value functions of a game of survival one is studying solutions of a Cauchy problem for the Isaacs-Bellman equation and there are interesting analogies with certain techniques of classical potential theory.
1. Introduction. The present work is a sequel to our earlier papers on differential games ( [1] , [2] , [3] ). As before, a differential game is a dynamical system whose dynamics are described by a family of differential equations, in which there are present two controllers or players Jt and J2 with directly conflicting interests. In papers [1] and [2] we discussed fixed time games, and in [3] we treated pursuit-evasion games and generalized pursuit-evasion games which end when the trajectory enters a certain set F, called the terminal set. The time at which this occurs is called the capture time. When the game ends a real valued quantity called the payoff is computed. For fixed time games the payoff is of the form of an integral of a positive or negative function together with a possibly nonlinear functional on the space of trajectories. In generalized pursuit-evasion games the payoff is the integral up to the capture time of some nonnegative function h, whilst for pursuit-evasion games h is identically one so that the payoff is just the time elapsed before capture. During the course of the game the two players can affect the outcome of the game by choosing certain control variables. The greatest value that J, can force is called the lower value of the game, whilst the least value the minimizing player J2 can force is called the upper value.
This paper is concerned with games in which the payoff consists of the integral up to the capture time of a function h, which may be positive or negative, together with a terminal payoff (i.e. a function g of the final position as the trajectory enters F). Such games are called games of survival. Because h may change sign it is not a priori clear at any initial point which player should aim to terminate the game by trying to force the trajectory into F, so the situation is considerably more complicated than generalized pursuit-evasion games.
In §2 differential games of survival and their value functions are defined. New value functions g+ and Q~ are introduced; these naturally occur because of the delays when strategies are pieced together. Dynamic programming results are obtained in §3 relating values at any initial position with values at a later position.
Using the results of §3 the value functions are shown in §4 to be solutions (or, respectively, sub-or super-solutions) of the Isaacs-Bellman equation at points of differentiability.
If there is a C1 sub-solution 9 of the Isaacs-Bellman equation satisfying 9(t,x) > g(t,x) on the boundary of F, then approximation results proved in §5 enable one to show 9(t,x) > Q+(t,x).
The boundary 3F of F is said to be regular (see Definition 6.2) if certain value functions are continuous on 3F. It is shown in §6 that if 3F is regular then, roughly speaking, the value functions Q+ and V* are then continuous everywhere. The problem of determining sufficient conditions for the regularity of 3F is, therefore, of some interest and in §7, using the estimates of §5, it is shown that 3F is regular if there exist sub-and super-solutions of the Isaacs-Bellman equation or a related equation.
Some methods used in §7 are interesting adaptations of techniques used by Perron [10] in discussing the regularity of boundary problems for the Laplace operator. Finally, in §8, all the upper and lower values are shown to be equal if 3F is regular and the Isaacs condition is satisfied.
Some of our results are extensions of those of Friedman [4] for survival games, but all the techniques and the emphasis of this paper are rather different. Indeed, although the work has its origins in differential games of survival, as the above summary indicates it is really more concerned with functions related to solutions, and sub-and super-solutions, of Cauchy problems for the Isaacs-Bellman equation. For example, the results of §4 show that if the value function of the differential game is Lipschitz continuous then it is a generalized solution of this Cauchy problem. As the reference to Perron above indicates this is reminiscent of techniques of probabilistic potential theory where solutions to certain parabolic equations are constructed using an associated random process. Using the methods above one can obtain results concerning solutions to Cauchy problems for a whole family of nonlinear partial differential equations by constructing related differential games of survival, but this is something we discuss in another paper.
We wish to thank A. Friedman for finding an error in the original draft of this paper and for simplifying the proof of Lemma 4.3 by observing that the map of Lemma 4.2 is in fact a strategy.
2. Differential games and values. Let Y and Z be compact metric spaces; we consider the differential equation (1) dx/dt = x(t) = f(t, x,y, z)
where x e Rm and /, denoting time, belongs to [/0, oo]./: R X Rm X Y X Z -+ Rm is continuous and satisfies a Lipschitz condition in x:
(2) \\fit,xx,y,z) -fit,x2,y,z)\\ < K\\Xl -x2\\, where X\,x2 e Rm. We shall consider a differential game of survival Git0,x0) associated with (1) and the initial conditions T, and payoff
Here tF is the first time of entry of the trajectory x(t) into the terminal set, h: RXRmXYxZ-* Ris continuous, and g: R X Rm -* R is continuous. The player /, controlling^ e Y is trying to maximize P whilst J2 is trying to minimize P.
A map .y: [t0, oo] -* y is measurable if for every continuous real valued function \p on Y,\p°yis Lebesgue measurable. Denote by «4fi(»o) the space of such measurable functions, where two functions equal almost everywhere are identified. Similarly <dl/l2(to) denotes the space of measurable maps [t0, oo] -» Z. For i > Owe delinean s-delay strategy a for •/, as a map o: ^H2it0) -* <=Mx (?o) such that whenever 2iW = *iW a.e. r0 < / < r, then (a2i)(/) = (az2)(t) a.e. i0 < / < tt + s. (Note that the values of y = a(z) in [/0,'o + s) are independent of the function z(s).) The set of j-delay strategies is denoted by T,0(s). We define j-delay strategies for J2 similarly and denote the set byA,». V~(t0,x0) = supina);« E UT^J;
and in general we have (see [3] ) V~ < U, V < V+. For games of survival it is necessary to introduce another concept of value. First we define the ¿-perturbed value of a strategy; this is the value of a strategy when it is adopted only after a time s has elapsed. Thus in the initial interval [t0,t0 + s) the player is assumed to adopt any possible control function, conceivably the worst available. We say for two strategies a, a' E IJo(0), that a' £ r,;(a) if for any z E ¿H2(t0) (a'z)(t) = (az)(t) a.e. tQ + s < t < oo.
Similarly we say for ß, ß' E A,o(0) that ß' E &',0(ß) if for any y E <dl\i(t0) iß'y)it) -ißy)(t) a.e. ío + * < / < oo. The quantities Q+ and Q~ are alternative definitions of upper and lower value, in place of V+ and V~. However, if Q+ = Q~ then we can certainly assert that V+ = V.
Lemma 2.1. QA[t0,x0) < V~(t0,x0)and V+(t0,x0) < Q+(t0,x0).
Proof. This is immediate from the definitions, for clearly Q7i'o,x0) = inf sup u(a) < V~(t0,xQ) fors>0
and so Q~(to>x0) < V~(t0,x0). The other inequality is similarly proved.
Lemma 2.2. // G is a fixed time game (i.e. F = [T, oo] X R") then Q+itQ,x0) = V+(t0,x0)andQ'(t0,x0) = F"(r0,x0).
zProof. We sketch then details only. If a S T,o(0) then \P(a'z, z) -P(az,z)\ = 0(s) uniformly in z e <=M2it0), a' e T,so(a) and a e I¡0(0). Therefore \u(a') -u(a)\ = 0(s) so \u(a) -us(a)\ = 0(s) uniformly in a e r,0(0). In particular, for a e T,0(s), since ß7(f0,*o) > sur^g^^i/^o), u(a) < QJ(t0,x0) + 0(s). Therefore V~(t0,x0) < Q (/0,x0)andso V (í0.^o) = Q~(to>xo) by Lemma 2.1.
The following example shows that in games of survival the situation is more complicated. We consider only a simple game in which Jx (the maximizer) appears only in a trivial role, i.e. he has no effect on the course of the game. In this case the game reduces to an optimal control problem for J2, the minimizer. It is clear that J2s optimal strategy is to adopt z(f) m (0,-1) and in this case the payoff is given by tF = J, so that V+(t0,x0) = J. However, if s > 0 and J2 has no control over his choice of z(t) for 0 < t < s, then the trajectory may move to the point (s, ?), and then no possible choice of z(t) results in a payoff of less than one. Hence Q+(to,xo) ~ '• 3. Dynamic programming. We now consider a very general type of differential game formed from the original game G(tQ,xQ). Let 0 be any function (not necessarily continuous) defined on Rx Rm and let t be any map t: JWx (t0) X cM2(íq) -» [¿o, oo) which prescribes a stopping time r(y, z) corresponding to any pair of control functions. We define a game Gr(to>x0;9) as the game with initial condition (3), dynamics (1) and payoff: (7) Rfi(y,z) = 9(r( y,z),x(r(y,z))) + V*** h(t,x(t),y(t),z(t))dt.
• Qt(t0,x0;9) = inf QXr(tQ,x0;9).
As usual we have the relationships (8) ßT"(io,xo;0) < VT-(t0,x0;9) < UT(t0,x0;9), (9) Q:(t0,x0;9) > VT+(t0,x0;9) > VT(t0,x0;9).
Furthermore, since any a £ T,0(0) and ß E \(s) produce a unique control pair v E J\n\(tn), z E *M2(ta), such that ßy = z and az = y, we have
. (10) UT(t0,x0;9) < VT+(t0,x0 ;9) and similarly (11) K(t0,x0;9)> VT-(t0,x0;9).
We now use games Gt(íq,x0;9) to derive several "dynamic programming" results relating the values of G(t0,x0) to those of GT(?0,x0; 6) for various 0. Note that G(t0,xQ) is just the game G¡r(t0,x0;g); we shall consider r such that T(y,z) < tfiy,z) t°r all >», z. t is said to be nonanticipating if whenever
a.e. t0 <t<r(y,z), z'(t) = z(t) a.e. t0 < t < r(y,z), then riy',z') = -r(y,z). Note that tF is nonanticipating.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose r is nonanticipatory and t < tF. Then
F(z0,x0) = Jí(r0,x0; K).
zProof. Only the former identity will be proved; the second follows by symmetry. For (t,x) e Rm+l and e > 0 there is an a = <*(/,*) e T,(0) such that u(a) > U(t,x) -(e/2). There is also an oq e I^0(0) such that «T>t/(a0) > UT(to> x0;U)-(e/2). Now define a' e r,o(0) as follows: For z e *M2(t0) let o(z) = liotoz^) and define ia'z)(t) = (a0z)(t), tQ < t < a(z), (a'z)(i) = a(oiz),x(a(z)))z(t), a(z) < t < oo, where x(t) is the trajectory corresponding to (o¡o z,z). The second equality above is interpreted by restricting z to an element of &M2(a(z)). It is clear that a' e r,o(0) and furthermore
> Ur(t0,x0;U)-e so that U(t0,x0) > UT(h,xa; U). Conversely, given a0 e 11(0) then there exists a control z e <dH2it0) with
for the trajectory x(t) corresponding to (txoz.z). Now define â E T^z)(0) by ä~w(t) = ao"(')' °(z) < ' < oo, where
Then in G(a(z),x(a(z))): u(a) < U(a(z),x(o(z))) and so there is a control function (o0 e «=^2(ff(2)) with P(ä0<o0>«o) < Í7(a(z),x(a(z))) + (e/2).
If we now define
then we have
so that U(t0,x0) < U7(t0,x0; U). We now consider similar results for V+ and V~. However, in this case delay strategies do not fit together as neatly as ordinary strategies and so we only obtain inequalities in place of the equalities of Theorem 3.1. Theorem 3.2. Suppose t is nonanticipating and r < tF. Then (14) F+(/0,x0) > VT+(tQ,x0; V+), (15) V~(fo,xo) < VT-(t0,x0; V~).
Proof. We prove only the latter inequality. Suppose a E Yt<¡(s) for some s > 0 and z E ¿A42(t0). Again write oz = rj(z) = r(az,z) and consider G(az,x(oz)) where x(t) is the trajectory corresponding to (az, z). For w E J\i\2(oz) define w E cM2(t0) by w(r) = z(r), t0 < t < a(z),
and 5 E TB2(s) by
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Note that ä depends on z(t), t0 < t < az, and 5« is independent of w in [az,oz + s). In G(az,x(az)), u(a) < V~(oz,x(oz)) and so there exists u e aM2(oz) such that P(äu,u) < V~(az,x(oz)) + e. Therefore in G(t0,x0) P(aü,ü) < (<l) hdt+ V~(az,x(az)) + e "Z'o < /^-(c«ö,w) + e = Ey-(az,z) + e.
Hence u(a) < Ry-(az,z) + e and so u(a) < urV-(a) + e and (15) follows. Finally we consider Q+ and Q~; in this case we first have to treat Q* and Q~.
Theorem 33. Suppose j is nonanticipating and s < t < tF. Then
Q7it0,xo) > QJA'cXo; Q7).
Proof. We prove only (17). For e > 0, (t,x) e Rm+X and y e ^,(i0) there exists a = ait,x,y) e T,[s \y] such that, in Git, x), w(a) > Q~(t,x) -e. Now suppose a0 £ T,(s). For any z e ^H2ito) define az = i(a0z,z) and suppose Ar(z') is the trajectory induced by (a0z,z). ä e T,o(s) is then defined by az(t) = aQz(t), t0 < t < oz + s, 5z(i) = aíffZ.xíazJ.jJzíO, az + s < f < oo, where j(/) = a0z(t), az < t < oz + s. It is easy to check that 5 e T,0(s). For example, suppose z,(/) = z2(t) a.e. i0 < t < oz + su where 0 < st < s. Then oz* = az2 and a0z,(t) = a0z2(t) a.e. t0 < t < oz + it + s, and in particular y\(t) ~ Jiit) a.e. oz < t < oz + s.
Hence a(azi,x(az\ ),y¡) = a(oz2,x(oz2),y2) and so ctz\(t) = az2(i) a.e. t0 < f < oz + s + Si. Now P(az,z) = f" hdt + P*(a'z,z) where F* denotes the payoff in G(oz, x(oz)) and a' = a(oz,x(oz), y) e Tat(s). Thus Similarly, if lim ß*(/,x) = ß+(/,x) uniformly on compacta then
Proof. It is easy to show (see [2] ) that every possible trajectory (t, x(i)) with x(/0) = x0 determined by (1) Write oz0 = t(oz0,z0) and suppose x0(t) is the trajectory given by (az0,z0). Then there is a strategy ß0 E A"o(0) in G(oz0,x(oz0)) such that v(ß0) < V(oz0, x(oz0)) + e/3. Since a is a ¿e/ay-strategy, a and ß0 can be played against each other from oz0 onwards (cf. [3, §3] ). Therefore, there exists a z e ^M2ito) such that z(t) = z0(t), t0 < t < oz0, and (ß0a)z(t) = z(t), ozQ < t, where (ß0a)z(t) is interpreted as ß0 acting on the restriction of az(t) to oz0 < t. Then F(al,z) = i"" h(t,x0(t),az0(t), z0(t))dt + P*(aJ, z), Proof. As Z is a compact metric space there is a countable dense subset {£k;k = 1,2,...}. Consider the functions Qk: Z -» R where Qk(z) = d(£k,z), k = 1, 2, ..., d, denoting the metric on Z. By definition z(t) measurable means Qkiz(t)) is measurable in the usual Lebesgue sense, so by Lusin's theorem [6] , for e/2* there is a subset Ek of [0, 1] such that Qk(z(t)) is continuous on Ek and mEk > 1 -e/2*, k = 1, 2, .... Put E = lT=iFfc. Then mE > 1 -e and QkizU)) is continuous on E for all k = 1,2,_It is then immediate that z(t) is continuous on E.
We shall need the following extension of Fillipov's lemma: As y is a compact metric space there is a continuous map k of the Cantor set K onto Y (see [7, Theorem 3 .28]). We can, therefore, write M(z(t)) = maxseKm(K(s),z(t)). For each / E E denote by K(t) the set of all s £ K that satisfy m(K(s),z(t)) = M(z(t)). Continuity of m and k implies that K(t) is closed, and so compact. Write u(t) = min(s E K(t)). It remains to prove that u(t) is measurable, and this will be the case if we can show that for any real A the set {/ E E; u(t) < À} is closed. Suppose this is not the case; then there exists a sequence t¡ E E such that t¡ -> t £ E but u(tj) < A < u(t). As K is compact there is a subsequence {{,<} of {f,} such that u(ty) -> m E AT asy' -» oo, and we must have (24) u < u(t).
Letting t = ty converge to T in the identity m(ic(u(t)),z(t)) = M(z(t)) we have, by continuity on E, m(K(û),z(t)) = M(z(t)). Thus the point « belongs to K(t). But from the definition of u(t), u(t) < H, which contradicts (24). Thus {t £ E; u(t) < X} must be closed, and so u(i) is measurable on E. Now take e = I/« and denote the corresponding set E by En. We see that u(t) is measurable on each E" and so on their union E*. As the measure of E* is t we see u(t) is measurable on [0, r]. Because the map k is continuous the composite function ic o u(t) = y(t) is measurable on [0, t] and gives the required function y. Note, by the method of selection, that y(t) depends only on z(t) and so the map a sending z to its corresponding y is a strategy in Iq(0).
Suppose now the two players play a very simplified differential game K(m;r) where the payoff is of the form P = f0T m(y(t),z(t))dt. From Lemma 2.1 and the remarks preceding it we see ß+ = V* = U = T minzmaxJlm(y, z). The dual result follows similarly. We now return to the general game discussed in § §2 and 3. Our object is to show the relationship between the value functions U, V, V~, V+, Q~ and ß+ of (/, x) and the solutions of certain partial differential equations associated with the system, first considered by Isaacs [8] . We define for the differential game associated with (l)- (4) where both equations are subject to the boundary condition w(t, x) = g(t, x) for (/,x) E 3F, F being the terminal set. Here R is continuous at 0 and R(0,0) = 0 and the partial derivatives are evaluated at (r0, x0). Using (29) we deduce that, if (t0 + s, x0 + £) is on a trajectory starting at (r0, x0), • VU; then by (30) \uT(tQ,x0; u) -uT(t0,x0; W)\ < SV(s).
Hence \U(t0,x0) -UT(t0,xo', W)\ < st\(s) and so \U7(h,x0; W0)\ < sii(s) where W0(t0 + s;x) = soU/ot + (x-x0) • VU. In the game Gr(t0,x0; W0) the payoff corresponding to a pair of controls^ e «?Hi(/<>). * e <=W2itt>), is given by P = s^-+ (x -x0) ■ VU + f**' h(t,x,y(t),z(t))dt = C (lT+^t'x^'z^ ■ VU + h(t,x,yit),zii))) dt where, of course, the partial derivatives are evaluated at (t0,x0). Theorem 5.1. Let G be the differential game given by (l)-(4). Then given a bounded subset B of (-00, T] X Rm there exists a function tj: [0,00) -* [0,00) such that linv^T/fc) = 0 and with the following property: For every (t0,x0) G B there exists ß 6 A,0(i) such that whenever ß" e a',0iß) and y e «^i(/0). then for the trajectory x'(t) induced by (y, ß'y) we have (32) <p(f,*'('),X0> #><')) < *it,x') +V(s) whenever t0 + s < t < T..
Proof. Every trajectory with initial point in B is contained in a further bounded
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use set B' for t < T (see [2, §3]). Write M = supfl.)<yxZ||/(/,x,.y,z)||. Suppose x,(i) and x2(i) is any pair of trajectories corresponding to the same pair of controls (y(i), z(t)) but with initial conditions (i*0>*i) and (i0,x2) E B'. Then using (2) we obtain MO-^«11 <***-*> Ik-*2 II <M'||x,-x2||, t0<t<T,
where M' = e**7"-'"). For i > 0 let sup|<p(zj,x,,y,z) -<p(t2,x2,y,z)\ = y(s), where the supremum is taken over (y,z) E YX Z and (tx,x,) and (t2,x2) in B' such that \t2 -fi | < 2s, \\x2 -x, || < 2M(M' + l)i. By uniform continuity of <p on /yxyxZ, lim^oY^) = 0. Now fix (/0,x0) E 5 and let t" = t0 + «j, « = 1, 2.We define ß as follows: Let z0 be any fixed control value in Z.
Then for any y £ <=4t, (/") we let ßy(t) = z0, t0 < t < r,.
Then we define
where Z\ is chosen such that maxtpízo.xo^.z,) = $(t0,x0). y The pair (y(í), ßy(t)) induce a trajectory x(f), t0 < t < t2, and we then choose z2 such that maxcp(ii,x(r,),.y,z2) = $('i>*('i)) y and define $y(0 = z2> h < * ^ '3. We then repeat this process and eventually ¿8 is denned so that ßA') = 2K, tn<t< tn+l, where maxtp(t"_,,x(tH_,),y,z") = $(/"_,, xir,,.,)).
Using Zorn's lemma ß is extended to the whole of <d\A\(tQ) as in Lemma 4.3.
Clearly ß E A,0(s). Now suppose ¿8' E A'h(ß) so that /3>(i) = ßy(t), t > t0A-s. Let x'(t) be the trajectory induced by (y, ß'y). Then kfe) -*(OII < 2Ms and so ||jc'(/) -x(t)\\ < 2MM's, t0<t<T.
Now if n > 1 and t" < t < tn+i then \\x'(t) -x(tn_x)\ < 2MM's + 2Ms and |f -/"_[ | < 2s, and so \<p{t,x'(t),y(t),zn) -cpit^^xO^ilyOXzJ < y(s).
Clearly \$(txx'(t)) -*CVi .*fo-i))l < yis) and so <p(t,x'(t),yit),ß'yit)) < 90, At)) + 2Aí» for f, < t < T.
Theorem 5.2. For every (t0,x0) with tQ < T and every e > 0 there exists a strategy a e Ij0 such that if z G ¿M2ito) and xil) is me trajectory corresponding to (ptz.z) (33) <p(t,x(t),az(t),z(t)) > Q(t,x(t)) -e a.e.
far t0 < t < T. For s > 0 and (/0>^o) fixed we define tn = t0 + ns and construct a, e r|0; thus
Then (ajZ.z) determines a trajectory x(t), t0 < t < /,. We define asz(t) = a[tx, x(tx )]z(t), tx<t< t2, and proceed inductively. Clearly as e Th and rp(/n,jc(/,,),a,z(i),z(/)) > $(t",x(tn)) a.e.
for tn < t < tn+x and « > 0. Using the uniform continuity of <p as in Theorem 5.1 we obtain for t0< t <p(t,x(t),asz(l),zi>)) > $(',*(')) -Vis) a.e.
where linv^oTjii) = 0. This proves (33).
We now come to the main theorem of the section, in which we compare a C1 function 6 satisfying either L+0 > 0 or L+9 < 0 everywhere with the value of the game G. Results of this type were first considered by Rao [11] and later by Friedman [5] . However, in [11] Rao restricts his attention to fixed time games and Friedman, who approximates by solutions of parabolic equations, requires that 0 is C and piecewise C2, together with his condition (F). The referee tells us that Rao considered comparison theorems for pursuit-evasion games in his thesis (University of Rhode Island, 1971).
Theorem 53. Let G be the game given by (l)-(4) and suppose 9 is a continuous function on Rm+l which is Cl on Rm+l -int F. Suppose <pit,x'(t),y(t),ß'y(t))< <K(f,x'(í)) + r,(s) for t0A-s < t < T (equation (32)). We use here Lemma 3.22 of Friedman [4] , that t \-* 9(t,x(t)) is absolutely continuous and d9(t,x(t)) _d9
-It--87 + * " ™ Thus by (37) and (38) Piy,ß'y) = gitF,AtF))+['Fhdt J,0 < 9(tF,x'(tF))+ i'Fhdt = 9(t0,xQ) + £" <p(t,At),y(t),ß'y(t))dt Qîito,x0) < 9(t0,x0) + As)
where r¡'(s) = Ms + (T -íq)i}Ís). This proves (35) and (34) follows immediately. We remark that as in Friedman [5] , we may improve Theorem 5.3 by observing that since every trajectory emanating from a fixed point (io>-*o) is contained in a bounded set B" we need only insist that L+9 < 0 on B" to obtain 0(to,xo) > Q+ito,x0).
We now prove the converse theorem using Theorem 5.2:
Theorem 5.4. Suppose G is given by (1)-C4) and 9 is continuous on Rm+1 and continuously differentiable on Rm+l -int F. Suppose
Proof. We omit the proof as it is almost the same as that of Theorem 5.3, using Theorem 5.2 instead of Theorem 5.1.
Naturally, both the above theorems may be stated for L~ with Q~ replacing Q+ and F replacing U. Proof. By 5.3 we obtain 9 > ß+ and by 5.4 we obtain 9 < U. As U < Q+ we obtain the result. 6 . Continuity of V* and ß+. Thus far we have not referred to the problem of continuity of the functions V+ and ß+. In general (see §2) we may expect that V+ and ß+ are discontinuous. The behavior of the functions near the boundary turns out to be critical. Although we omit the proof, which uses Theorem 3.1, we may observe that U is continuous if and only if U is continuous at each point of 3F(i.e. iff U(t,x) -* U(t',x') =g(t\ x')whenever (t,x) -► (t',x') E dF).
Define for each (t,x) E Rm+l -int F for (t,x) E BR. Here p = p(/,x) is the distance of(t, x)from F.
Proof. (For (r,x) eisn 3F, (42) is simply Dini's theorem since each Q7 is upper semicontinuous.) Define Tj(y) = sup (Oik*)-*(/,*)).
J+P<Y
We must show that lim^Tjíy) = 0. If not, there exist sequences sn -* 0 and (t",xn) £ BR such that inf(ß:(i",x") -g(tn,xn)) = e > 0, and limn_QOp(i",xn) = 0. By selecting a subsequence we may suppose that (tn,xn) -* (t0,x0). Clearly p(/0,x0) = 0, i.e. (t0,x0) E F. For o > 0 there exists «o such that for n > n0, s" < o. Then Qt(tn,x") < Q*(t",x"), n > n0, and so ßo^O'^o) ^ gOo'Xo) + e for all a > 0, contrary to assumption (41). Definition 6.2. A point (t, x) of 3F is ß+-regular if it satisfies (41) and U is continuous at (t, x), i.e. linizT,£)_^r>x)i/(T,£) = U(t,x) = g(t,x). We shall say 3F is ß+ regular if every point of 3F is Q+ regular.
In order to prove the next theorem it will be necessary to replace the Lipschitz condition (2) in x by a Lipschitz condition in both t and x:
(43) ||/(/"x"y,z) -/(f2,x2,y,z)|| < tffl,, -t2\ + ||x, -x2||).
Theorem 63. Under the Lipschitz condition (43), suppose dF is Q+-regular, then Q+ is continuous (on Rn+l -int F) and lim Qï(t,x) = Q+(t,x) s-»0 uniformly on compacta.
Proof. Note if (f,x) E 9F the continuity of Q+(t, x) follows from Lemma 6.1 and Definition 6.2. Consider the set C = Br n (Rm+1 -int F) for some r > 0. Then any trajectory with initial point in C is contained, for / < T, in a larger compact set BR.
First we observe that g and h are uniformly continuous on BR and BR X YXZ respectively. Thus there exists a function At (8) So by (48) (53) Qî,r+Ati,x2;g) < QUAh,x2; U) + A3 (8) .
Finally, by Lemma 3.5,
QUaih,x2;U)<Q:(t2,x2).
Combining (51), (52), (53) and (54) As 8 is arbitrary ß*(r,x) -Q+(t,x) > e -A2(2s). By Lemma 6.1 and Definition 6.2 a similar inequality holds when (t,x) E Ms(e) n 3F. Because lims^0A2(2s) = 0 we conclude that r\s>0Ms(e) = 0. By the compactness of C there exists s0 such that M^ie) = 0, i.e. Qtit.x) -Q*(t,x) < e for s < s0. Hence lim^ö* = Q+ uniformly on C. However, this contradicts (58), and so Q+(t0,x0) = V+it0,x0).
7. Criteria for regularity. In this section we present two convenient tests for the ß+-regularity of the boundary 3F. The first is based on the comparison theorems of §5 whilst the second is based on a similar criterion for the regularity of the boundary for the Laplacian operator V2 given by Perron [10] (see also Krzyzariski [9, pp. 377-396]). Theorem 7.2. Let (<o,x0) £ 3F and suppose there is a neighborhood N of (t0,x0) and there exist C1 functions 9X ,92onN such that (i) 9x(t0,x0) = 02(zo,xo) = 0, 92(t,x) < 0 < 9x(t,x) for (t,x) E (zV -int F),
(ii) Lq9x < 0 < Lq92 on N -int F. Then it0,x0) is ß+ regular.
Proof. Let
A; = {(/,x): k-/0l + \\x-x0\\ <r).
For small enough r, Nr C tV. We also let Mr = Nr C\ (Rm+l -int F). Write <p(a«.><<),/3>«) < *(',«(')) + iW for ? + *</< T.
Here $(f,x) = min2 max, <p(t\x,y,z) = L%9,(t,x), so <p(r,£(r),.)'(i).r3>W) < 1(0 for (/,£(<■)) E N and / + s < t < T.
Suppose BR is a set large enough to contain every trajectory starting in N, and let A = sup rp(r,x,y,z).
B"xYxZ
With £(r) the trajectory above, let t' be the time when |(f) hits 3A/f. Then (/•',£(/')) either belongs to 3zVf or to 3F.
Suppose (*',*(/')) E 3A7 Then 0,(i',£(/')) > 8x(r) > 9x(7,Z(t)) + Jô,(r).
Hence that is ¡_'' <p(t,t(t),Át),PÁt))dt > \sx(r).
Therefore (/' -7)tj(í) + /4j > ^ô,(r), and, as f' -t < 2r,
2r-q(s) + As < ^(r).
However, lim,_^Tj(.s) = 0 so s can be chosen small enough so that 2ri)(s) + As < \8x(r) thus contradicting (64). Therefore, (/',£(/')) E 3Fand t' = tF. Then
Piv,ß'y) -£'h(t,e(t),A'),ß'A<))dt + gitF,íitF)) < 2Hr + X(r) + g(t0,x0) so that i/(/3') < 2Hr + A(r) + g(f0,x0). Hence ß^i.x) < 2//r + \(r) + git0,x0) and so &(t0,x0) < 2Hr + X(r) + g(t0,x0) for s small enough. Proof. Lq92> Lq92 and L% > LfJ in general. Hence, by Theorem 7.2, (t0,x0) is g+-regular. However, conversely we always have L¿" 9X < Lj> 9\ < 0, and so we may apply the 'negative version' of Theorem 7.2 to deduce that (i"0.*o) is Q~-regular.
The conditions of the corollary may be considered as allowing both players to force (t, jc(0) nearer (t0,xo) from any initial position (t],JCi). They are, therefore, a localized version of Friedman's conditions (F) (see [4, p. 81] ). We now prove that a generalization of Friedman's conditions ensures regularity. Proof. For (/0.^o) G 3F"let 9t(t,x) = 9x(t,x) + yi(\t -t0\2+ \\x -x0\\2).
Then for suitable -yi and in a small enough neighborhood of (t0,x0) L¿9f < 0, 9t > 0, (t,x) # (t0,x0).
Similarly we construct 9*2(t,x) = 92(t,x) -y2(\t -/"I2 + h -*oll2)
with small enough y2 so that in some neighborhood of (t0,x0) L¿9Í > 0, 02* < 0, (t,x) # (t0,xQ).
Therefore, we may apply Theorem 7.2 to deduce that (io»*o) is Q+-regular. Friedman [4] uses p and -p for f?i and 92 and assumes F is sufficiently smooth to guarantee the differentiability of p near 3F.
Of course, it is possible to 'mix' the criteria of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2. For example, for every point of 3F to be ß+-regular it is sufficient that there exist 6X as in Theorem 7.1 and for each (/0>^o) G o F a. function 02as in Theorem 7.2.
In the particular case of a generalized pursuit-evasion game where g = 0 and h > 0, it is easy to see one has L+(02) > 0 where 92 is the function identically zero. Thus the existence of a function 92 satisfying the conditions of Theorem 7.1 is automatically guaranteed by the type of game under consideration, and one only has to establish 'one-sided' conditions of the type of Theorems 7.2 or 7.4 to prove regularity. We can now apply the inductive construction of Theorem 6.4 to deduce a contradiction if Q+ito,xo) *= QA[t0,x0). Therefore, Q+ito,x0) = ß~(/0>^o) f°r all(zo,Xo) e Rm+i -intF.
It is worth observing that the Isaacs condition (65) implies L+ m L~ and also that Lj = Lq. Hence, the sufficient conditions for Q+-regularity of §7 will also ensure ß~-regularity. It seems reasonable to conjecture that ß+-and Q~-regularity are equivalent in general if the Isaacs condition is satisfied.
